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[Editor's note: This article is the last in a 
series on "Research Questions for the New 
Millennium." The series aims to identify 
research needed to inform employment policy 
in the near future.]
.ere's a quick quiz: is housing 
today more or less racially segregated 
than in 1860, the first year of the Civil 
War? You might be tempted to answer 
"less segregated" based on the 30 years of 
racial progress that has followed the 
passage of major civil rights legislation in 
the 1960s. Besides, you answer, surely 
we live in a more racially integrated 
society today than the one in which 
slavery was still legal. Nevertheless, if 
you answered "less segregated," you 
would be wrong.
To understand this surprising result 
you need a brief review of the 
dissimilarity index, the standard measure 
of segregation in housing. A score of 0 
corresponds to perfect integration and a 
score of 100 indicates absolute 
segregation. The index itself is typically 
interpreted as the percentage of the 
minority population that would have to 
move in order to achieve full integration. 
The average dissimilarity index calculated 
for free blacks and whites for residents in 
major northern cities in 1860 showed that 
about 45 percent of all blacks would have 
to move in order to fully integrate the
typical city. In the South that number was 
closer to 30 percent. The latest figures 
from census 2000 show that in the 50 
cities with the largest black populations, 
the median dissimilarity index is 65. The 
most segregated city in the United States, 
Detroit, has a dissimilarity score of 85 
(Lewis Mumford Center 2001).
Table 1 makes it clear that the intense 
social isolation of racially homogeneous 
ghettos is a construction of the early 
industrial era. Each row shows the 
dissimilarity index for selected northern 
cities from 1860 to 2000. A confluence of 
formal legal barriers and informal social 
hostilities see Massey and Denton 
(1993, Chapter 2) for a fuller discussion 
of these factors caused the average 
segregation level to double from 46.6 to 
89.2 in the period from 1860 to 1940. 
Since 1940, segregation has decreased but 
at a relatively slow rate. Consider for a 
moment that the average dissimilarity 
index for cities in Table 1 has declined 17 
points in 40 years, or about 4 points per 
decennial census. At this rate of decline, 
these particular cities would not reach 
segregation levels lower than those in 
1860 until the year 2060.
A growing number of studies suggest 
that racial segregation in housing may 
have a profound effect on our society. For 
instance, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) 
estimate that a one-standard-deviation
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decline in black/white segregation would 
narrow the black/white gap in schooling 
(high school and college graduation 
rates), employment (labor force 
participation rates and earnings), and 
single parenthood by about one-third. 
Recent reviews (Kain 1992; Holzer 1991) 
of the spatial mismatch literature indicate 
that the employment prospects of central 
city residents, especially young and 
unskilled laborers, have been adversely 
affected by a geographic shift in the 
location of entry-level jobs away from 
traditionally black and Hispanic central 
cities and toward typically white suburban 
areas. Thus, by isolating minorities to 
low-job-growth areas, racial segregation 
increases spatial mismatch and 
contributes to poor labor market 
outcomes. Other studies have linked high 
levels of racial segregation to poor 
educational attainment (Orfield 1997), 
increased infant and adult mortality rates 
(La Viest 1993; Collins and Williams 
1999), increased homicide rates (Peterson 
and Krivo 1999), and even decreases in 
voter turnout (Cohen 1983).
Racial segregation in housing is caused 
by three principal factors: voluntary 
sorting, interracial differences in socio- 
economic status, and discriminatory 
practices perpetuated by rental agents and 
realtors. The first factor, the preferences 
that people have over the racial 
composition of their neighborhood, is not 
directly controllable through legislation 
(although its impact on segregation is 
undeniable). Segregation in housing 
would be of considerably less interest to 
social scientists if voluntary sorting were 
its only cause. When studying 
segregation in housing, social scientists 
typically ignore the effect of voluntary 
sorting and search for empirical strategies 
that allow them to quantify the impact of 
either differences in socioeconomic status 
or involuntary sorting caused by 
discriminatory practices. Almost no 
research exists to date that decomposes 
black/white segregation into these three 
components.
There is little evidence that the second 
factor, differences in income, wealth, and 
educational attainments, has a large effect
on segregation levels. Studies that 
calculate segregation indices for blacks 
and whites in different income groups 
report very little variation in segregation 
levels as incomes rise and fall. For 
instance, using data from the 1980 census, 
sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy 
Denton (1993) calculated the dissimilarity 
index for blacks and whites with incomes 
below $2,500, between $25,000-27,500, 
and above $50,000 for 30 major 
metropolitan areas. The average indices 
by income group for the northern cities 
examined were 85.8, 80.7, and 83.2, 
respectively. A similar pattern held for 
cities in the South. There is little - 
evidence that racial segregation in , 
housing is in fact a by-product of 
economic stratification.
Given the deleterious effects of 
segregation, public policy should 
be directed at educational efforts 
and enforcement measures of 
fair housing laws.
The third factor, discrimination in 
housing markets, is perhaps the most 
important factor because it not only 
substantially increases segregation but is 
also amenable to policy measures. 
Despite the passage of civil rights 
legislation in the 1960s that granted 
minorities the legal right to equal access 
in housing, there is evidence that 
discrimination persists. National audit 
studies conducted by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development that 
send pairs of black and white testers to 
visit realtors and rental properties 
revealed that blacks are likely to be given 
less information on housing availability 
than are their white counterparts in 
approximately one out of every five visits. 
The most egregious form of 
discrimination in housing availability  
telling minorities that a property is not for 
rent or for sale when the white tester is 
told the opposite occurs about 7 percent 
of the time in the sales market and about 
10 percent of the time in the rental market 
(Yinger 1992).
This high incidence of discrimination 
in housing markets affects segregation 
through two mechanisms, one direct, the 
other indirect. The direct mechanism is 
the most obvious: blacks who seek 
apartments or homes in white 
neighborhoods often find those efforts 
stymied. Minorities are more likely to 
find housing in areas predominantly 
populated by minorities because 
information about such properties is more 
readily available.
The second mechanism involves the 
effect of discrimination on the search 
behavior of blacks looking for homes and 
apartments. Research has shown that 
blacks utilize the services of realtors in 
much lower numbers than whites and that 
a large part of this differential is due to 
the fear of experiencing discrimination 
(Parley et al. 1979). Realtors are losing 
business because minorities dread the 
humiliation associated with 
discrimination. To avoid discrimination, 
minorities appear to minimize their 
exposure to situations that could 
potentially end in disparate treatment. 
While there are few empirical studies of 
housing search behavior, it is not hard to 
imagine that this fear of discrimination 
affects other aspects of minority search 
patterns that exacerbate racial 
segregation. A logical extension of 
Parley's findings is the possibility that 
minorities are less likely to search for 
housing in predominately white areas, not 
because they find those areas unappealing 
per se, but because they fear the increased 
likelihood of experiencing discrimination.
Given the deleterious effects of 
segregation mentioned above, public 
policy should be directed at educational 
efforts and enforcement measures of fair 
housing laws that might decrease the 
incidence of discrimination, lower 
involuntary segregation, and lead to a 
more integrated society. Fortunately, 
there are some simple measures that may 
reduce both racial discrimination and 
segregation in housing.
The first measure is the imple 
mentation of community education 
programs focusing on fair housing laws 
and compliance. The second involves 
using housing audits to investigate fair
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Average 46.6 59.2 89.2 81.4 72.2
SOURCE: For 1860, 1910, and 1940, Massey and Denton (1993, Table 2.1, p. 21); for 1970, Mas 
sey and Denton (1993, Table 2.3, p. 47); for 2000, Lewis Mumford Center press release (2001). 
aNA = data not available. ;
housing complaints. Depending on the 
severity of the infractions and the strength 
of the evidence, the most appropriate 
result of an enforcement audit may be 
either education or legal actions.
The third measure is performing audits 
that measure the overall incidence of 
housing discrimination in the community 
and publishing the results in a widely read 
forum, such as the local newspaper. The 
purpose of this last measure is twofold. 
First, it monitors the effectiveness of the 
first two measures. If education and 
enforcement activities produce the 
desired results, then the overall incidence 
of housing discrimination should decline 
with time. Second, credible evidence that 
racial discrimination in housing is 
declining may induce minorities to 
increase their search efforts for housing in 
predominantly white areas.
Unfortunately* the effectiveness of 
these measures on either search behavior 
or the discrimination rate is simply 
unknown. Research to date on 
segregation in housing has focused on 
questions such as "Does discrimination 
still exist in housing markets?" and "Can 
housing segregation simply be a result of
economic status?" and has left the 
question of how discrimination causes 
segregation largely unexplored. The 
answers to basic questions, such as what 
the response of segregation is with respect 
to the discrimination rate, how the 
discrimination rate varies under different 
enforcement regimes, and whether 
discrimination in housing is pro- or 
countercyclical, are unknown at this time. 
Given the sizable effect of segregation on 
economic and social outcomes, it is 
reasonable to believe that new empirical 
research clarifying the relationship 
between search, discrimination, and 
segregation may be welcomed not only by 
other social scientists, but by 
policy makers as well.
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2001 Grant Awards
The W.E. Upjohn Institute has made its 
Grant Program awards for 2001 and 
extends its congratulations to the 
recipients. Six grants were awarded this 
year. The recipients and their projects are 
as follows:
  Marcy Whitebook, University of 
California, Berkeley: "Then and 
Now: Changes in Child Care 
Staffing, 1994-2000"
  Wayne Vroman, The Urban Institute: 
"Unemployment and Employment 
Protection: An International 
Analysis"
  Brian Klaas and Hoyt Wheeler, 
University of South Carolina: 
"Workplace Justice without Unions"
  John Formby, University of Alabama: 
"The Minimum Wage, Earned 
Income Tax Credit, Payroll Taxes, 
and Poverty"
  Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest, 
The Urban Institute: "Leaving 
Welfare: Employment and Well- 
Being of Families that Left Welfare 
in the Post-Entitlement Era"
  Western Michigan University: 
Department of Economics Guest 
Lecture Series 2001-2002.
Also awarded this year were 10 mini- 
grants. The recipients and their projects 
are the following:
  Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, San 
Diego State University: "Wage 
Dynamics for Temps and Perms: The 
Role of Geographic Mobility"
  Eric Bettinger and Robert Slonim, 
Case Western Reserve University: 
"The Effect of Educational Vouchers 
on Academic and Non-Academic 
Outcomes: Experimental Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment"
  Alan Durell, Dartmouth College: 
"Fairness as a Constraint on Wage 
Setting"
Kay Glasgow, California Polytechnic 
State University: "NUEWO: New 
Understanding of Employment and 
Work Organization"
David Greenberg and Mark Shroder, 
University of Maryland, Baltimore 
County: "Proposal for a Supplement 
to The Digest of the Social 
Experiments'"
Brent Kreider and John Pepper, 
University of Virginia: "The Effects 
of Health Status and Disability 
Insurance Policy on Labor Force 
Participation: Reevaluating the 
Existing Evidence in Light of 
Reporting Errors"
'. Kevin Lang, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology: "Voluntary 
Desegregation and Human Capital 
Acquisition in Recipient School 
Districts"
1 Robert Oxoby, University of Calgary: 
"Motivating Work Teams: A 
Behavioral Economic Analysis"
' Kimberlee Shauman, University of 
California, Davis: "Family 
Migration: Causes and Consequences 
for Men and Women in Dual-Career 
Couples"
  Kosali Simon and Daniel 
Rosenbaum, Cornell University: 
"Health Benefits in the Low-Wage 
Sector: The Effect of Medicaid 
Expansions, Labor Market 
Conditions and Rising Health 
Insurance Costs."
Earle to Join Institute
John S. Earle will join the staff of the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute as a senior 
economist late in 2001. Prof. Earle 
earned his Ph.D. from Stanford 
University in 1988 and was a Fulbright 
Scholar in Vienna in 1988 to 1990. He 
currently holds positions at the Stockholm 
School of Economics and the Central 
European University, and he has been the 
director of the Central European 
University Labor Project since 1994. 
Some of his other professional work has 
been for the World Bank, the Institute for 
the Study of Labor at the University of 
Bonn, the Russian-European Centre for 
Economic Policy, and the William 
Davidson Institute at the University of 
Michigan.
Earle has written widely on European 
economics and is a frequent speaker at 
economics conferences. He has 
coauthored several books on the 
economics of privatization in Central and 
Eastern Europe, including Small 
Privatization (London: CEI Press, 1994) 
and Privatization in the Transition to a 
Market Economy (London: Pinter and 
New York: St. Martin's, 1993). Three of 
his books have been translated and 
published in several Eastern European 
languages. Earle is currently working on 
two new books on economics in Russia 
and Eastern Europe.
Prof. Earle also has notable talents 
outside the realm of economics, perhaps 
foremost of which is being a concert 
pianist. He received a bachelor's of music 
degree in piano performance from 
Oberlin College and Conservatory as part 
of a double degree program in music and 
economics. He has performed in Europe 
and competed in the prestigious 
Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in 
Moscow. The Institute looks forward to 
having Prof. Earle on its senior staff.
Timothy J. Bartik
An my new book, Jobs for the Poor: 
Can Labor Demand Policies Help ?, I 
argue that U.S. antipoverty policy would 
be more effective with a more balanced 
use of labor demand and supply policies. 
Current U.S. policy overemphasizes labor 
supply policies. The book suggests new 
labor demand policies to increase both 
overall labor demand and labor demand 
for the poor.
Labor supply policies directly interact 
with the poor to increase their labor 
supply, job skills, or wages. Examples of 
labor supply policies include welfare 
reform, job training, and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Labor 
demand policies directly interact with 
employers to affect the number of poor 
persons hired. Examples of labor demand 
policies include public works programs of 
the 1930s, public service jobs funded by 
the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act during the 1970s, and tax 
credits for employers hiring the 
disadvantaged (1970s to the present).
What are the arguments for greater use 
of labor demand policies? The first is that 
despite the economic boom of the 1990s, 
more jobs are still needed by America's 
poor. For example, in order for each poor, 
non-elderly U.S. household to have one 
full-time, full-year worker, we would 
need 9 million more full-time, full-year 
jobs. Employment rates for low- 
education groups are still low compared 
to past norms. For example, suppose our 
goal was to increase the employment rates 
of all working-age heads of households 
without a college degree to the 
employment rate that similar white males 
experienced in 1979. Achieving this goal 
would require 5 million more jobs.
A second argument for labor demand 
policies is that labor supply policies by
themselves have significant limitations. 
One limitation is that it is difficult or 
costly (either financially or socially) for 
labor supply policies to cause large 
increases in the employment of the poor. 
Welfare reform has pushed over a million 
persons into the labor force, but 40 
percent of these new labor force entrants 
are not employed, which is a significant 
social cost. Job training programs have 
benefits that exceed their modest costs, 
but their benefits are also modest (an 
increase in earnings of perhaps $1000 
annually per trainee). Wage supplements 
to the poor such as the EITC help many 
working Americans out of poverty but 
usually only have modest effects in 
increasing employment; for example, the 
EITC has increased employment by at 
most one-half million persons.
A further limitation of labor supply 
policies is that they cause displacement 
effects. When labor supply increases, 
labor demand does not instantly go up by 
the same amount. As a result, some jobs 
obtained by the new labor force 
participants result in fewer job openings 
for others. For example, estimates 
suggest that for every 10 jobs obtained by 
former welfare recipients, 3 to 7 jobs are 
lost by other less-educated workers.
A third argument for labor demand 
policies is that aggregate demand policies 
are necessary but insufficient to solve 
poverty. Estimates suggest that a 
1 percent lower unemployment rate will 
lower the poverty rate by 0.3 percent to 
0.9 percent, which would bring 0.9 
million to 2.6 million people out of 
poverty; yet unemployment rates cannot 
be lowered sufficiently to solve poverty. 
In 1999, the U.S. unemployment rate was 
4.2 percent and poverty was 11.8 percent. 
Even lowering unemployment to zero,
which is impossible, would not eliminate 
poverty.
A fourth argument is that targeted 
demand programs can be effective. Over 
the years, the United States has 
experimented with a number of programs 
that hire targeted low-employment groups 
for public service jobs or subsidized jobs 
with private employers. During the 
subsidy period, these programs typically 
result in huge increases in employment 
rates. It is common for the earnings or 
employment of the target group to 
increase by 60 percent or more of the 
earnings and employment subsidized by 
the program (Table 1). This means that 
these programs are effective in identifying 
individuals who otherwise would have 
been jobless. These targeted demand 
programs also usually yield jobs that are 
productive; employers often are surprised 
at the high productivity of these 
subsidized hires.
Targeted demand programs can cause 
significant earnings increases that persist 
long after the subsidy period. For 
example, the Supported Work program of 
the late 1970s yielded increases in 
earnings for former welfare recipients of 
about 25 percent of in-program earnings 
that persisted largely unchanged for at
Table 1 In-Program Impacts of
Subsidized Jobs Programs
Program Ratio3
Supported Work (1970s) 0.79
Youth Incentive 0.61 
Entitlement Pilot Projects 
(1970s)
Youth Corps (1990s) 0.57
New Hope (1990s) 0.68
Summer Youth Jobs 0.67
aThis ratio shows the estimated net impact of 
the program on the employment and earnings 
of program participants during the period in 
which subsidized employment was provided 
divided by the employment or earnings 
directly provided by the program. 
SOURCE: Bartik, Timothy J. 2001. Jobs for 
the Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies Help? 
Table 7.1, p. 182.
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least eight years after the program. Why 
does short-run subsidized employment 
have long-run earnings effects? A 
plausible explanation is that a well-run 
subsidized jobs program increases 
workers'"soft" job skills. Soft skills 
include, for example, showing up at work 
consistently and getting along with 
supervisors, co-workers, and customers. 
Studies suggest that problems with soft 
skills explain why many disadvantaged 
workers lose their jobs. Soft skills are 
difficult to teach in a classroom; they are 
better learned through a supportive job 
experience.
What specific labor demand policies 
do I recommend? First, I recommend that 
the United States permanently enact a 
revised version of the New Jobs Tax 
Credit that was in place in 1977 and 1978. 
This revised tax credit would provide 
subsidies to all employers that expanded 
overall employment (not just jobs for the 
poor) above some baseline level if they 
are located in high-unemployment local 
labor markets. This subsidy would be 
credited against payroll taxes (the Social 
Security and Medicare trust funds would 
be reimbursed from general revenues), so 
the subsidy would encourage employment 
expansion by all employers; for-profit, 
nonprofit, and public. In periods of low 
national unemployment such as we have 
recently experienced, this tax credit 
would only apply to the few high- 
unemployment areas. Research shows 
that geographically targeting labor 
demand increases on high-unemployment 
local labor markets reduces inflationary 
pressures; but, if the U.S. economy went 
into a prolonged recession, the revised 
New Jobs Tax Credit would apply 
nationwide. Studies suggest that such a 
credit might offset about one-fourth of the 
normal job loss caused by a recession.
Second, I recommend we adopt a 
revised version of the MEED program 
used by the state of Minnesota in the 
1980s. Local workforce boards would, on 
a discretionary basis, award wage 
subsidies to selected employers that hired 
selected individuals from disadvantaged 
groups. The subsidies could go to either 
public or private employers. To reduce 
displacement of current workers, the
subsidies could only go for newly created 
jobs. The subsidies would be targeted on 
individuals in poverty who are unlikely to 
find a steady job on their own, based on 
their own past history and the results of a 
trial job search. The subsidy period 
would be no more than six months, which 
is sufficient to provide training in soft 
skills. Preference in awarding subsidies 
would go to employers that can provide 
good on-the-job training in both soft and 
"hard" skills and that are willing to "roll 
over" subsidized hires into permanent 
jobs with some prospect for advancement.
Discretionary control of this program 
by local boards is a crucial distinction 
from our current tax subsidies to 
employers hiring the disadvantaged. Our 
current program is an entitlement that 
goes, for example, to many restaurants for 
hiring workers they would have hired 
anyway. Under a discretionary program, 
the wage subsidies can be more carefully 
targeted on both workers and employers. 
Wage subsidies should be limited to 
persons unlikely to find steady work in 
other ways and to employers that are 
willing to change hiring practices and 
provide career opportunities to those who 
are hard to employ.
Running these two demand programs 
at a level sufficient to make a large 
difference to poverty would require tens 
of billions of dollars per year in additional 
government spending or tax credits. 
However, no realistic antipoverty policy is 
cheap. The aggregate poverty gap in the 
United States the difference between 
the incomes of the poor and the income 
needed to be out of poverty is $65 
billion annually. Are we serious in 
promoting employment as a solution to 
poverty? If so, we must commit the 
resources needed to significantly increase 
the employment and earnings of the poor.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. Jobs for the Poor: Can Labor 
Demand Policies Help? is jointly published 
by the Russell Sage Foundation and the 
Upjohn Institute and is available for 
purchase at http://russellsage.org/ 
publications/titles/jobs_poor. htm. The 
research for this book was supported by the 
Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundations 
and the Upjohn Institute. This article and 
the book reflect the findings and views of 
the author and may not reflect the views of 
the sponsors of this research.
Seeking Manuscripts
The Institute publishes books on subjects of importance to policymakers, 
labor economists, and practitioners who study labor market problems and 
programs to address them.
The majority of the books we publish originate from our Grant Program or 
from the Institute's in-house staff of professional economists. However, we also 
invite submissions of publishable book-length manuscripts and proposals for 
books from outside scholars and policy analysts. These submissions will be 
reviewed promptly by Institute staff, and manuscripts that appear promising will 
receive external anonymous peer review.
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The calls for health care reform are 
as loud as they are persistent. A variety 
of stakeholders both inside and outside 
the health care industry regularly voice 
their concerns 




and coverage for 
the uninsured, and 
the role of tax 
policy in health 
care. While 
federal policymakers have so far failed 
to enact sweeping legislation 
addressing the nation's health care 
system, significant changes affecting 
health care financing, insurance, and 
service delivery have occurred.
The political implications and 
economic consequences of these 
reforms are the subject of this new 
book. The chapters, authored by a 
select group of leading health 
economists, provide insights valuable 
for evaluating further developments in 
what are sure to be ongoing and 
contentious health care reform efforts. 
Included are
• The Not-So-Simple Economics (and 
Politics) of Medicare Reform, 
Len M. Nichols
• Managed Care and Social Welfare, 
Laurence Baker
• Covering the Uninsured, 
Jonathan Gruber
• Health Insurance and the Labor 
Market, Brigitte Madrian
• Health Care Consumer Choice, 
Catherine G. McLaughlin
• Positive Economics and Dismal 
Politics, Robert B. Helms
1 80 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-224-7 
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-223-9 / July 2001.




The Economics of 
Medicare Reform
Andrew J. Rettenmaier 
and Thomas R. Saving
The authors propose a means for 
preserving Medicare as we know it. 
After detailing the reasons for 
Medicare's financial troubles, they
present a pre-paid, 
cohort-based 
financing plan that 
represents a 
fundamental 
departure from the 
generation-transfer 
method currently 
used. Their system 
requires each age 
cohort to contribute to accounts that, 
by the time of their retirement, would 
contain a large enough sum to pay for 
their cohort's remaining lifetime health 
care expenditures.
This method, they say, eliminates 
the cohort size risk that faces us now 
due to the retirement of the baby boom 
generation.
"By moving to prepaid financing," 
say Rettenmaier and Saving, "we 
remove the disincentives to invest, and 
the nation will experience an increase 
in its capital stock and income. It is 
this increase in the capital stock and 
national income that provides the 
additional resources available to pay 
off most, but not all, of the current 
system's unfunded liability. There is 
no free lunch," they conclude, "but 
there is a considerably cheaper lunch 
that is of better quality than the one we 
are currently committed to buying."
190 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-212-3 
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-211-5 / 2000.





Peter P. Budetti, Richard V. Burkhauser,
Janice M. Gregory, and H. Allan Hunt,
editors
During the next two decades, the 
number of older workers in the United 
States will nearly 
double. This 
bulge, soon to be 
a conspicuous 
aspect of the 




the way public 
and private programs are designed to 
support these individuals at work and 
in retirement. This volume presents a 
group of forward-looking papers that 
explore implications of an aging 
workforce for a number of social 
programs in the coming decades, 
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